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Abstract—Herein, design of false data injection attack on
a distributed cyber-physical system is considered. A stochastic
process with linear dynamics and Gaussian noise is measured by
multiple agent nodes, each equipped with multiple sensors. The
agent nodes form a multi-hop network among themselves. Each
agent node computes an estimate of the process by using its sensor
observation and messages obtained from neighbouring nodes,
via Kalman-consensus filtering. An external attacker, capable of
arbitrarily manipulating the sensor observations of some or all
agent nodes, injects errors into those sensor observations. The
goal of the attacker is to steer the estimates at the agent nodes
as close as possible to a pre-specified value, while respecting
a constraint on the attack detection probability. To this end,
a constrained optimization problem is formulated to find the
optimal parameter values of a certain class of linear attacks. The
parameters of linear attack are learnt on-line via a combination of
stochastic approximation and online stochastic gradient descent.
Numerical results demonstrate the efficacy of the attack.
Index Terms—Attack design, distributed estimation, CPS secu-
rity, false data injection attack, Kalman-consensus filter, stochas-
tic approximation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent times, there have been significant interest in
designing cyber-physical systems (CPS) that combine the
cyber world and the physical world via seamless integration
of sensing, computation, communication, control and learning.
CPS has widespread applications such as networked moni-
toring and control of industrial processes, disaster manage-
ment, smart grids, intelligent transportation systems, etc. These
applications critically depend on estimation of a physical
process via multiple sensors over a wireless network. However,
increasing use of wireless networks in sharing the sensed data
has rendered the sensors vulnerable to various cyber-attacks.
In this paper, we focus on false data injection (FDI) attacks
which is an integrity or deception attack where the attacker
modifies the information flowing through the network [1], [2],
in contrast to a denial-of-service attack where the attacker
blocks system resources (e.g., wireless jamming attack [3]).
In FDI, the attacker either breaks the cryptography of the data
packets or physically manipulates the sensors (e.g., putting a
heater near a temperature sensor).
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A. Related Literature
The cyber-physical systems either need to compute the pro-
cess estimate in a remote estimator (centralized case), or often
multiple nodes or components of the system need to estimate
the same process over time via sensor observations and the
information shared over a network (distributed case). The
problem of FDI attack design and its detection has received
significant attention in recent times; attack design: conditions
for undetectable FDI attack [4], design of a linear deception
attack scheme to fool the popular χ2 detector (see [5]), optimal
attack design for noiseless systems [6]. The paper [7] designs
an optimal attack to steer the state of a control system to a
desired target under a constraint on the attack detection proba-
bility. On the other hand, attempts on attack detection includes
centralized (and decentralized as well) schemes for noiseless
systems [8], coding of sensor output along with χ2 detector
[9], comparing the sensor observations with those coming from
from a few known safe sensors [10], and the attack detection
and secure estimation schemes based on innovation vectors in
[11]. Attempts on attack-resilient state estimation include: [12]
for bounded noise, [13]–[15] for adaptive filter design using
stochastic approximation, [16] that uses sparsity models to
characterize the switching location attack in a noiseless linear
system and state recovery constraints for various attack modes.
FDI attack and its mitigation in power systems are addressed
in [17]–[19]. Attack-resilient state estimation and control in
noiseless systems are discussed in [20] and [21]. Performance
bound of stealthy attack in a single sensor-remote estimator
system using Kalman filter was characterized in [22].
However, there have been very few attempts for attack
design and mitigation in distributed CPS, except [23] for attack
detection and secure estimation, [24] for attack detection in
networked control system using a certain dynamic watermark-
ing strategy, and [25] for attack detection in power systems.
To our knowledge, there has been no attempt to theoretically
design an attack strategy in distributed CPS.
B. Our Contribution
In light of the above issues, our contributions in this paper
are the following:
1) Under the Kalman-consensus filter (KCF, see [26]) for
distributed estimation, we design a novel attack scheme
that steers the estimates in all estimators towards a
target value, while respecting a constraint on the attack
detection probability under the popular χ2 detector
adapted to the distributed setting. The attack scheme
is reminiscent of the popular linear attack scheme [5],
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but the novelty lies in online learning of the parameters
in the attack algorithm via simultaneous perturbation
stochastic approximation (SPSA, see [27]). The attack
algorithm, unlike the linear attack scheme of [5], uses
a non-zero mean Gaussian perturbation to modify the
observation made at a node, and this non-zero mean is
an affine function of the process estimate at a node. The
optimization problem is cast as an online optimization
problem, where SPSA is used for online stochastic
gradient descent (see [28, Chapter 3]).
2) The constraint on attack detection probability is met by
updating a Lagrange multiplier via stochastic approxi-
mation at a slower timescale.
3) Though the proposed algorithm involves on-line parame-
ter learning, it can be used off-line to optimize the attack
parameters which can then be used in real CPS.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. System
model and the necessary background related to the problem
are provided in Section II. The attack design algorithm is
developed in Section III, and its performance in evaluated
numerically in Section IV. Conclusions are made in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND BACKGROUND
In this paper, bold capital letters, bold small letters and
capital letters with caligraphic font will denote matrices,
vectors and sets respectively.
A. Sensing and estimation model
We consider a connected, multihop wireless network (see
Figure 1) of N agent nodes denoted by N .= {1, 2, · · · , N}.
The set of neighbouring nodes of node k is denoted by Nk,
and let Nk
.
= |Nk|. There is a discrete-time stochastic process
{x(t)}t≥0 (where x(t) ∈ Rq) which is a linear Gaussian
process evolving as follows:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + w(t)︸︷︷︸
∼N (0,Q)
(1)
where w(t) is zero-mean i.i.d. Gaussian noise.
Each agent node is equipped with one or more sensors
who make some observation about the process. The vector
observation received at node k at time t is given by:
yk(t) = Hkx(t) + vk(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∼N (0,Rk)
, (2)
where Hk is a matrix of appropriate dimension and vk(t)
is a Gaussian observation noise which is independent across
sensors and i.i.d. across t.
At time t, each agent node k ∈ N declares an estimate
xˆ(k)(t) using Kalman consensus filtering (KCF, see [26])
which involves the following sequence of steps:
1) Node k computes an intermediate estimate x¯(k)(t) =
Axˆ(k)(t− 1).
2) Node k broadcasts x¯(k)(t) to all j ∈ Nk.
1
Attacked	vehicle	sending	false	
information	to	its	neighbors
xˆ(1)(t) xˆ
(2)(t)
xˆ(3)(t) xˆ(4)(t)
Figure 1. False data injection attack in remote estimation.
3) Node k computes its final estimate of the process as:
xˆ(k)(t) = x¯(k)(t) +Gk(yk(t)−Hkx¯(k)(t))
+Ck
∑
j∈Nk
(x¯(j)(t)− x¯(k)(t)) (3)
Here Gk and Ck are the Kalman and consensus gain matrices
used by node k, respectively.
B. False data injection (FDI) attack
At time t, sensors associated to any subset of nodes At ⊂ N
can be under attack. A node k ∈ At receives an observation:
y˜k(t) = Hkx(t) + ek(t) + vk(t), (4)
where ek(t) is the error injected by the attacker. The attacker
seeks to insert the error sequence {ek(t) : k ∈ At}t≥0 in
order to introduce error in the estimation. If At = A for all t,
then the attack is called a static attack, otherwise the attack is
called a switching location attack. We will consider only static
attack in this paper. We assume that the attacker can observe
xˆ(k)(t) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ N once they are computed by the
agent nodes.
C. The χ2 detector
Let us define the innovation vector at node k by zk(t) :=
yk(t)−HkAxˆ(k)(t−1). Let us assume that, under no attack,
{zk(t)}t≥0 reaches its steady-state distribution N(0,Σk).
Under a possible attack, a standard technique (see [5],
[10]) to detect any anomaly in {zt}t≥0 is the χ2 detec-
tor, which tests whether the innovation vector follows the
desired Gaussian distribution. The detector at each agent
node observes the innovation sequence over a pre-specified
window of J time-slots, and declares an attack at time τ if∑τ
t=τ−J+1 zk(t)
′Σ−1k zk(t) ≥ η, where η is a threshold which
can be adjusted to control the false alarm probability. The
covariance matrix Σk can be computed from standard results
on KCF as in [26].
The authors of [5] proposed a linear injection attack to fool
the χ2 detector in a centralized, remote estimation setting.
Motivated by [5], we also propose a linear attack, where, at
time t, the sensor(s) associated with any node k ∈ A modifies
the innovation vector as z˜k(t) = Tkzk(t) + bk(t), where
Tk is a square matrix and bk(t) ∼ N(µk(θ(k)(t − 1)),Sk)
is independent Gaussian. The bias term µk(θ(k)(t − 1)) is
assumed to take a linear form µk(θ(k)(t− 1)) = Mkθ(k)(t−
1) + dk for suitable matrices and vectors Mk and dk. This
is equivalent to modifying the observation vector to y˜k(t). If
{Tk,Sk,Mk,dk}1≤k≤N is constant over time t, the attack is
called stationary, else non-stationary.
D. The optimization problem
The attacker seeks to steer the estimate as close as possible
to some pre-defined value x∗, while keeping the attack detec-
tion probability per unit time under some constraint value α.
Note that, the probability of attack detection per unit time slot
can be upper bounded as:
Pd ≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
τ=0
N∑
k=1
P(
τ∑
t=τ−J+1
z˜k(t)
′Σ−1k z˜k(t) ≥ η)
≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
τ=0
N∑
k=1
E(
∑τ
t=τ−J+1 z˜k(t)
′Σ−1k z˜k(t))
η
=
J
η
lim sup
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
τ=0
N∑
k=1
E(z˜k(t)′Σ−1k z˜k(t)) (5)
where the first and second inequalities come from union bound
and Markov inequality, respectively. Hence, the attacker seeks
to solve the following constrained optimization problem:
min
{Tk,Sk,Mk,dk}Nk=1
lim sup
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
N∑
k=1
E||xˆ(k)(t)− x∗||2
s.t. lim sup
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
N∑
k=1
E(z˜k(t)′Σ−1k z˜k(t)) ≤
αη
J
(CP)
This problem can be relaxed by a Lagrange multiplier λ to
obtain the following unconstrained optimization problem:
min
{Tk,Sk,Mk,dk}Nk=1
lim sup
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
N∑
k=1
E(||xˆ(k)(t)− x∗||2
+λz˜k(t)
′Σ−1k z˜k(t))
(UP)
The following standard result tells us how to choose λ.
Proposition 1. Let us consider (CP) and its relaxed ver-
sion (UP). If there exists a λ∗ ≥ 0 and matrices
{T ∗k ,S∗k ,M∗k ,d∗k}Nk=1 such that (i) {T ∗k ,S∗k ,M∗k ,d∗k}Nk=1 is
the optimal solution of (UP) under λ = λ∗, and (ii) the tuple
({T ∗k ,S∗k ,M∗k ,d∗k}Nk=1, λ∗) satisfies the constraint in (CP)
with equality, then ({T ∗k ,S∗k ,M∗k ,d∗k}Nk=1, λ∗) is an optimal
solution for (CP) as well.
III. ATTACK DESIGN
We first analytically characterize the dynamics of the devi-
ation (xˆ(k)(t) − x∗) in presence of linear attack, which will
be used in developing the attack design algorithm later.
Our proposed algorithm maintains iter-
ates {Tk(t),Uk(t),Mk(t),dk(t)}1≤k≤N for
{Tk,Uk,Mk,dk}1≤k≤N , where U ′kUk .= Sk. Let
Fτ .= σ({xˆ(k)(t),yk(t),Tk(t),Uk(t),Mk(t),dk(t),
bk(t)}1≤k≤N , λ(t) : 1 ≤ t ≤ τ) (6)
be a sigma algebra; this is the information available to the
attacker at time (τ + 1) before a new attack.
A. Dynamics of deviation from target estimate
Let us assume for the sake of analysis that the attacker uses
constant Tk and Sk respectively, for all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
Under this attack:
xˆ(k)(t)
= Axˆ(k)(t− 1) +Gkz˜k(t) +Ck
∑
j∈Nk
(x¯(j)(t)− x¯(k)(t))
= Axˆ(k)(t− 1) +Gk(Tk(yk(t)−HkAxˆ(k)(t− 1)) + bk(t))
+ CkA
∑
j∈Nk
(xˆ(j)(t− 1)− xˆ(k)(t− 1)) (7)
Let us define θ(k)(t) .= xˆ(k)(t) − x∗. Let φ˜(t) .=
(xˆ(t) − x(t)), where xˆ(t) .= E(x(t)|{yk(τ)}1≤k≤N,τ≤t) =
E(x(t)|Ft) which can be computed by a standard Kalman
filter. Let φ˜(t) ∼ N (0,R(t)), whose distribution can be com-
puted by a standard Kalman filter. Hence, conditioned on Ft,
the distribution of φ(t) .= (x(t)−x∗) is N (xˆ(t)−x∗,R(t)).
θ(k)(t)
= (A−GkTkHkA)xˆ(k)(t− 1)
+GkTk yk(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
.
=HkAx(t−1)+Hkw(t−1)+vk(t)
+Gkbk(t)
+CkA
∑
j∈Nk
(xˆ(j)(t− 1)− xˆ(k)(t− 1))− x∗
= (A−GkTkHkA)θ(k)(t− 1) +GkTkHkAφ(t− 1)
+CkA
∑
j∈Nk
(θ(j)(t− 1)− θ(k)(t− 1))− (I −A)x∗
+GkTkHkw(t− 1) +Gkbk(t) +GkTkvk(t)
= (A−GkTkHkA−NkCkA)θ(k)(t− 1)
+CkA
∑
j∈Nk
θ(j)(t− 1)− (I −A)x∗ +GkTkHkAφ(t− 1)
+GkTkHkw(t− 1) +Gkbk(t) +GkTkvk(t) (8)
Clearly, E(||θ(k)(t)||2|Ft−1) can be expressed as (9).
Note that, given {θ(k)(t − 1) : 1 ≤ k ≤ N},
the function
∑N
k=1 E(||θ(k)(t)||2|Ft−1) is quadratic in
{Tk,Uk,Mk,dk}1≤k≤N .
On the other hand, given Ft−1, x(t − 1) ∼ N (xˆ(t −
1),R(t − 1)) where (xˆ(t − 1),R(t − 1)) can be computed
by a standard Kalman filter. Now,
z˜k(t) = Tkzk(t) + bk(t)
= Tkyk(t)− TkHkAxˆ(k)(t− 1) + bk(t)
= Tk(Hkx(t) + vk(t))− TkHkAxˆ(k)(t− 1) + bk(t)
= TkHkAx(t− 1) + TkHkw(t− 1) + Tkvk(t)
−TkHkAxˆ(k)(t− 1) + bk(t)
E(||θ(k)(t)||2|Ft−1) = ||(A−GkTkHkA−NkCkA)θ(k)(t− 1) +CkA
∑
j∈Nk
θ(j)(t− 1)− (I −A)x∗ +Gk(Mkθ(k)(t− 1) + dk)||2
+Tr(GkTkHkQH′kT
′
kG
′
k +GkSkG
′
k +GkTkRkT
′
kG
′
k)
+2
(
(A−GkTkHkA−NkCkA)θ(k)(t− 1) +CkA
∑
j∈Nk
θ(j)(t− 1)− (I −A)x∗ +Gk(Mkθ(k)(t− 1) + dk))
)′
GkTkHkAE(φ(t− 1)|Ft−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=xˆ(t−1)−x∗
+ E(||GkTkHkAφ(t− 1)||2|Ft−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Tr
(
GkTkHkA
(
R(t−1)+(xˆ(t−1)−x∗)(xˆ(t−1)−x∗)′
)
A′H′
k
T ′
k
G′
k
) (9)
E(z˜k(t)′Σ−1k z˜k(t)|Ft−1) = Tr
(
Σ
− 1
2
k
(
TkHkQH
′
kT
′
k + TkRkT
′
k + Sk + TkHkAR(t− 1)A′H′kT ′k
+[TkHkAxˆ(t− 1)− TkHkAxˆ(k)(t− 1) +Mkθ(k)(t− 1) + dk]
[TkHkAxˆ(t− 1)− TkHkAxˆ(k)(t− 1) +Mkθ(k)(t− 1) + dk]′
)
Σ
− 1
2
k
)
(10)
which, given Ft−1, is distributed as N (TkHkAxˆ(t− 1)−
TkHkAxˆ
(k)(t− 1) +Mkθ(k)(t− 1) + dk,TkHkQH ′kT ′k +
TkRkT
′
k + TkHkAR(t − 1)A′H ′kT ′k + Sk). Hence,
E(z˜k(t)′Σ−1k z˜k(t)|Ft−1) is given by (10).∑N
k=1 E(z˜k(t)′Σ
−1
k z˜k(t)|Ft−1) is also quadratic
in {Tk,Uk,Mk,dk}1≤k≤N . In case of non-
stationary attack, these results will hold w.r.t.
{Tk(t),Uk(t),Mk(t),dk(t)}1≤k≤N .
Hence, the function ft({Tk,Uk,Mk,dk}1≤k≤N ) .=∑N
j=1 E(||θ(j)(t)||2 + λ(t − 1)z˜k(t)′Σ−1k z˜k(t)|Ft−1) is also
quadratic in {Tk,Uk,Mk,dk}1≤k≤N . We also note that,
if Tk is fixed (e.g., the identity matrix), then the function
ft({Uk,Mk,dk}1≤k≤N ) is convex in {Uk,Mk,dk}1≤k≤N .
B. The attack design algorithm
In this subsection, we propose an optimal linear attack algo-
rithm for distributed CPS (OLAAD). The OLAAD algorithm
involves two-timescale stochastic approximation [29], which
is basically a stochastic gradient descent algorithm with a
noisy gradient estimate; (UP) is solved via SPSA in the faster
timescale, and λ is updated in the slower timescale.
The algorithm requires three positive step size sequences
{a(t)}t≥0, {b(t)}t≥0 and {c(t)}t≥0 satisfying the follow-
ing criteria: (i)
∑∞
t=0 a(t) =
∑∞
t=0 b(t) = ∞, (ii)∑∞
t=0 a
2(t) < ∞,∑∞t=0 b2(t) < ∞, (iii) limt→∞ b(t)a(t) = 0,
(iv) limt→∞ c(t) = 0, and (v)
∑∞
t=0
a2(t)
c2(t) < ∞. The first
three conditions are standard requirements for two-timescale
stochastic approximation. The fourth condition ensures that
the gradient estimate is asymptotically unbiased, and the fifth
condition is required for the convergence of SPSA.
The OLAAD algorithm
Input: {a(t)}t≥0, {b(t)}t≥0, {c(t)}t≥0, α, η, J ,
Initialization: Tk(0),Sk(0) = U ′k(0)Uk(0), Mk(0), dk(0)
for all k ∈ N , λ(0)
For t = 1, 2, 3, · · · :
1) For each 1 ≤ k ≤ N , the attacker generates random
matrices ∆(k)(t), Γ(k)(t), Π(k)(t) and β(k)(t) having
same dimensions as Tk(t − 1), Uk(t − 1), Mk(t − 1)
and dk(t− 1) respectively, whose entries are uniformly
and independently chosen from the set {−1, 1}.
2) The attacker computes T+k
.
= Tk(t− 1) + c(t)∆(k)(t),
T−k
.
= Tk(t − 1) − c(t)∆(k)(t), U+k
.
= Uk(t −
1) + c(t)Γ(k)(t), U−k
.
= Uk(t − 1) − c(t)Γ(k)(t),
M+k
.
= Mk(t − 1) + c(t)Π(k)(t), M−k
.
= Mk(t −
1)− c(t)Π(k)(t), d+k
.
= dk(t− 1) + c(t)β(k)(t), d−k
.
=
dk(t−1)−c(t)β(k)(t), for all 1 ≤ k ≤ N . The matrices
S+k
.
= (U+k )
′U+k and S
−
k
.
= (U−k )
′U−k are computed.
3) The attacker computes:
κ+t
.
=
N∑
j=1
E
(
(||θ(j)(t)||2 + λ(t− 1)z˜j(t)′Σ−1j z˜j(t)
|Ft−1, {T+k ,S+k ,M+k ,d+k }1≤k≤N
)
(11)
using (9) and (10) under {T+k ,S+k ,M+k ,d+k }1≤k≤N .
The attacker computes κ−t in a similar way using
{T−k ,S−k ,M−k ,d−k }1≤k≤N .
4) The attacker updates each element (i, j) of Tk(t − 1),
Uk(t− 1), Mk(t− 1) and dk(t− 1) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ N
as follows:
Tk(t)(i, j) = Tk(t− 1)(i, j)− a(t)×
(κ+t − κ−t )
2c(t)∆
(k)
(i,j)
(t)
Uk(t)(i, j) = Uk(t− 1)(i, j)− a(t)×
(κ+t − κ−t )
2c(t)Γ
(k)
(i,j)
(t)
Mk(t)(i, j) = Mk(t− 1)(i, j)− a(t)×
(κ+t − κ−t )
2c(t)Π
(k)
(i,j)
(t)
dk(t)(i, 1) = dk(t− 1)(i, 1)− a(t)×
(κ+t − κ−t )
2c(t)β
(k)
(i,1)
(t)
(12)
The attacker computes Sk(t)
.
= (Uk(t))
′Uk(t) for all
1 ≤ k ≤ N .
5) The sensors make observations {yk(t)}1≤k≤N , which
are accessed by the attacker.
6) The attacker calculates zk(t) = yk(t)−HkAxˆ(k)(t−1)
for all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
7) The attacker calculates z˜k(t) = Tk(t)zk(t) + bk(t) for
all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, where bk(t) ∼ N (Mk(t)θ(k)(t−
1) + dk(t),Sk(t)) chosen independently of all other
variables. The observations are accordingly modified as
y˜k(t) = z˜k(t) +HkAxˆ
(k)(t− 1) and sent to the agent
nodes.
8) The attacker updates the Lagrange multiplier as follows:
λ(t) = λ(t−1)+b(t)(
N∑
k=1
z˜k(t)
′Σ−1k z˜k(t)−
αη
J
) (13)
9) The agent nodes compute the estimates locally, using
(3) and the modified {y˜k(t)}1≤k≤N . The agent nodes
broadcast their estimates to their neighbouring nodes.
end
Note that, if {Tk}1≤k≤N is kept fixed, then the first update
in step 4 of OLAAD is not required.
The OLAAD algorithm combines the online stochastic
gradient descent (OSGD) algorithm of [28, Chapter 3] with
two-timescale stochastic approximation of [29]. The λ(t)
iterate is updated in the slower timescale to meet the con-
straint in (CP). In the faster timescale, OSGD is used for
solving (UP). Since limt→∞
b(t)
a(t) = 0, the faster timescale
iterates {Tk(t),Uk(t),Mk(t),dk(t)}1≤k≤N view the slower
timescale iterate λ(t) as quasi-static, while the λ(t) iteration
finds the faster timescale iterates as almost equilibriated; as if,
the faster timescale iterates are varied in an inner loop and the
slower timescale iterate is varied in an outer loop. Note that,
OLAAD has no guarantee of convergence to globally optimal
solution in general.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Three agent nodes, scalar proces
We consider a line topology with N = 3 agent
nodes. Process dimension q = 1 and the observation
dimension at each node is 2. The system parameters
A,Q, {Rk}1≤k≤3, {Hk}1≤k≤3 are chosen randomly. The
KCF parameters {Gk,Ck}1≤k≤3 are computed using a tech-
nique from [26], and {Σk}1≤k≤3 are computed by simulating
the KCF under no attack.
For FDI attack, we set x∗ = 5, α = 0.3, η = 500,
J = 3, λ(0) = 7, a(t) = 0.5t0.6 , b(t) =
0.5
t0.9 , c(t) =
0.01
t0.1 ,
Tk(t) = I for all 1 ≤ k ≤ 3 and for all t ≥ 1, simulated the
performance of OLAAD for 1000000 iterations and evaluated
its performance between 500000-th to 1000000-th iteration.
However, motivated by the ADAM algorithm from [30], we
implemented an adaptive step size version of SGD with
the basic step sizes being {a(t), b(t)}t≥1,1 though gradient
estimation was done via simultaneous perturbation using step
size {c(t)}t≥1. In all problem instances, deviation from x∗
means the squared distance of x(k)(t) from x∗, summed over
nodes and averaged over time; similar definition applies to
deviation from origin.
We simulated multiple problem instances for different sam-
ple paths; some results are tabulated below:
We notice that the attack detection probability is 0 because
we consider a stronger constraint (upper bound to the actual
attack detection probability) in our formulation. The attack
1Note that, under ADAM, the conditions on step sizes in Section III-B are
not necessarily satisfied for all sample paths.
Problem Attack Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation
instance detection from x∗ from x∗ from origin from origin
probability under FDI (no attack) under FDI (no attack)
1 0 29.3367 75.3063 11.0587 0.3215
2 0 27.6588 75.4367 12.2885 0.4373
3 0 42.7055 75.3845 5.0898 0.4001
detection probability also depends on the system realization,
and the values of η and J . For some other values of η and J
and various system realizations, we obtained the following:
Problem Attack Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation
instance detection from x∗ from x∗ from origin from origin
probability under FDI (no attack) under FDI (no attack)
1 0.1190 70.8189 75.0383 0.2398 0.0014
2 0.0047 46.1039 75.2841 11.7185 0.3227
Table I
N = 3, q = 1
We observe that OLAAD significantly reduces the deviation
from x∗ = 5, and increases the deviation from the origin
which is the mean of x(t). In all instances, constraint on attack
detection probability is satisfied. This shows that OLAAD is
a viable FDI attack scheme for distributed CPS.
B. Five agent nodes, vector process
Here we used the same setting as before, except that N = 5,
process dimension q = 2, x∗ = [55]T , α = 0.1, η = 200,
J = 2, a(t) = 0.05t0.6 , b(t) =
0.05
t0.9 . The results are tabulated
next. It is to be noted that here also we observe the same
pattern in results as seen for N = 3.
Problem Attack Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation
instance detection from x∗ from x∗ from origin from origin
probability under FDI (no attack) under FDI (no attack)
1 0.0025 29.0400 251.3088 135.2330 1.3124
2 0 145.9975 252.0693 42.1946 2.0549
3 8.5× 10−5 22.6360 255.0649 177.5157 5.1584
However, it was also noticed across problem instances that,
if the initial step size values a(1), b(1), c(1) are significant,
then the iterated might be unstable due to high initial fluc-
tuation; hence, the initial values of the step sizes need to be
chosen carefully.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have designed an optimal linear attack
for distributed cyber-physical systems. The parameters of the
attack scheme were learnt and optimized on-line. Numeri-
cal results demonstrated the efficacy of the proposed attack
scheme. In future, we seek to extend this work for unknown
process and observation dynamics and also prove convergence
of the proposed algorithms.
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